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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Tun Doirxci. oV PERSONS RSIDING ABROAD UNDXR CONSULAR JURISDICTION.
-The question of domicil under consular jurisdiction was discussed at some
length by the present writer in an article which appeared in an earlier num-
ber of this review. See i7 MICH. LAW RPv. 437-455. When that article was
written some much quoted dicta and the decision of the Court of Appeal in
Casdagli v. Casdagli, 87 L. J. P. 73, 79, indicated that according to-the Eng-
lish rule a domicil of choice could not be acquired under consular jurisdiction.
The author ventured to criticise that extraordinary rule from the point of
view of the authorities and on principle. With regard to the authorities it
was suggested that what appeared to be the English rule was the outcome of
an obsolete theory of immiscibility, an imperfect analogy with commercial
domicil in prize law, an equally imperfect analogy with the atnomalous doc-
trine of Anglo-Indian domicil, and the accumulated dicta of distinguished
judges. On principle it was urged that the rule involved an unnecessary con-
fusion of domicil with lex dornicilii and that the acquisition of domicil under
consular jurisdiction should be governed by the same principles which con-
trol the acquisition of domicil elsewhere. The American case of Mather v.
Cunningham, 1O5 Me. 326, and LoRD JusTice ScRuToN's dissent'ng 
opinion
in the Casdagli Case were commended as offering a more satisfactory solu-
tion of the problem from all points of view.
It is gratifying to learn that LoRD JusTIcX ScRUTroN's dissenting oiinion
has been approved unanimously in the House of Lords. Casdagli v. Casdagli,
88 L. J. P. 49. Every line of authority which could be thought to lend any
support to the decision rendered by the majority in the Court of Appeal
seems to have been reviewed exhaustively in the House of Lords, and in
every instance the authority was found insufficient or beside the point. The
doctrine of immiscibility, whatever significance in general it may retain at
the present day, was eliminated from the problem presented by the case.
LoRD PINLAY said: "It has often been pointed out that there is a presump-
tion against the acquisition by a British subject of a domicil in such coun-
tries as China and the Ottoman Dominions, owing to the difference of law,
usages, and manners. Before special provision was made in the case of for-
eigners resident in such countries for the application to their property of their
own law of succession, for their trial on criminal charges by Courts which
will command their confidence, and for the settlement of disputes between
them and others of the same nationality by such Courts, the presumption
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against the acquisition of a domicil in such a country might be regarded as
overwhelming, unless under very special circumstances. But since special
provision for the protection of foreigners in such countries has been made,
the strength of the presumption against the acquisition of a domicil there is
very much diminished. Egypt affords a very good illustration of this." 88
L. J. P. 49, 53. The analogy with commercial domicil in prize law was re-
pudiated. Referring to The Indian Chief, LORD AnINSON remarked that
"judicial observations made in reference to this commercial domicil have
been treated as applicable to civil domicil, a most misleading error." 88
L. J. P. 49, 66. The doctrine of Anglo-Indian domicil was rejected as anom-
alous and not in poifit. See 88 L. J. P. 49, 61, 66. The accumulated dicta
were swept aside. See 88 L. J. P. 49, the pages cited in connection with each
of the following cases: The Indian Chief, 54, 66, 73; Maltass v. Maltass, 54,
68; In re Tootal's Trusts, 54, 55, 56, 6o, 6i, 62, 68, 69, 73, 74; Abd-ul-Messih
v. Chukri Farra, 56, 57, 58, ig, 61, 62, 63, 69, 74. Except for the case of
Tootal's Trusts, their Lordships appear to have been unanimous in thinking
that the Court of Appeal had been misled by dicta. Loa FINLAY seems to
have considered TootaFs Trusts an authority in support of the Court of Ap-
peal, but he thought that it was erroneous and that it ought to be overruled.
VISCOUNT HALDANE, LORD DUNEDIN, LORD ATKINSON, and Loan PHILLIMOR
found nothing in point in Tootal's Trusts except dicta which they agreed in
repudiating. VIscouNT HALDANM could not agree with the other Lords as to
the precise point which the case was intended to decide, but he joined in re-
jecting its dicta. Just what Tootal's Trusts decided is no longer important
since it has been repudiated in connection with the only type of case in which
it could have any practical application.
The final settlement by the House of Lords of this long vexed question
is equally satisfactory on principle. It has now been established in the Eng-
lish law that the requisites of domicil under consular jurisdiction are exactly
the same as they would be anywhere else, viz., residence and the animus
manendi. Nothing of the nature of a normal relationship to the peculiar
laws of the country of residence or of complete identification with the gen-
eral life of the inhabitants is necessary. See 88 L. J. P. 49, 56, 61, 63, 65.
LORD ATKINSON said: "I concur with ScRUTTON, L. J., in thinking that there
is no test which miust be satisfied for the acquisition of a domicil, of choice
in Egypt other than, and in addition to, those by which a similar domicil is
acquired in a European country, namely, voluntary residence there plus a
deliberate intention to make that residence a permanent home for an unlim-
ited period." 88 L. J. P. 49, 73. All confusion between domicil and the lex
domicilii has been avoided. See 88 L. J. P. 49, 56, 63, 71, 72. The distinction
between these two conceptions was admirably stated by LoR FINLAY, as fol-
lows: "The position of British subjects in such a country is not ex-terlri-
torial. The domicil is acquired, and can be acquired only by residence in
Egypt. The law applicable to the foreigner so residing is, by the consent of
the Egyptian Government, partly Egyptian and partly English. This is the
result of the Convention between the two Governments. Although the dom-
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icil is Egyptian, the law applicable to persons who have acquired such a
domicil varies according to the nationality of the person. The foreigner does
not become domiciled as a member of the English community in Egypt, but
he acquires an Egyptian domicil, because he, by his own choice, has made
Egypt his permanent home, and you have then to consider by what code of
law he and his estate are governed according to the law in force in Egypt.
The domicil is purely territorial, and you go to the law in force in the terri-
tory to see what system of law it treats as applicable to resident foreigners,
and to what Courts they are subject. 88 L. J. P. 49, 56. Finally, this posi-
tion has been atained without distorting the nature of consular jurisdiction.
It is not necessary to regard consular judisdiction as delegated authority; no
dialectical legerdemain need be indulged in order to find sovereignty and rec-
oncile it with realities. While the position of persons subject to consular
jurisdiction is not regarded as ex-teritorial, the jurisdiction itself is ex-terri-
torial in a very real sense. "The jurisdiction exercised by His Majesty in
Egypt is indeed ex-territorial, but it is exercised with the consent of the
Egyptian Government, and its jurisdiction is therefore for this purpose really
part of the law of Egypt affecting foreigners there resident. The position
of a British subject in Egypt is not ex-territorial; if resident there, he is
subject to the law applicable to, persons of his nationality. Whether that law
owes its existence simply to the decree of the Government of Egypt, or to the
exercise by His Majesty of the powers conferred on him by treaty, is im-
material." Per LoaD FINLAY, 88 L. J. P. 49, 53; see also 51, 52, 56, 63, 71, 72.
The decision of the House of Lords in Casdagli v. Casdagli has brought
the question of domicil under consular jurisdiction to a final and satisfactory
settlement. Tootal's Trusts may be relegated to the custody of the mysta-
gogue. Although that famous case is no longer significant as an authority,
it will always be a decision of considerable historical interest because of the
curious chapter in the evolution of dicta which it prov6ked.
E. D. D.
